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Abstract—Recently an online electric vehicle (OLEV) concept has been introduced, where vehicles are propelled through the
wirelessly transmitted electrical power from the infrastructure installed under the road while moving. The absence of secure-
and-fair billing is one main hurdle to widely adopt this promising technology. This paper introduces a secure and privacy-
aware fair billing framework for OLEV on the move through the charging plates installed under the road. We first propose
two extreme lightweight mutual authentication mechanisms, a direct authentication and a hash chain-based authentication
between vehicles and the charging plates that can be used for different vehicular speeds on the road. Second we propose
a secure and privacy-aware wireless power transfer on move for the vehicles with bidirectional auditability guarantee by
leveraging game-theoretic approach. Each charging plate transfers a fixed amount of energy to the vehicle and bills the
vehicle in a privacy-aware way accordingly. Our protocol guarantees secure, privacy-aware, and fair billing mechanism for
the OLEVs while receiving electric power from the road. Moreover our proposed framework can play a vital role in eliminating
the security and privacy challenges in the deployment of power transfer technology to the OLEVs.
Index Terms—Online Electric Vehicle, Wireless Power Supply, Privacy, Auditability, Billing
F
1 INTRODUCTION
As the fuel price is going up, alternative fuel vehicles, in
particular electric vehicles, are getting more attentions.
Previously, electric vehicles were suffering from various
issues such as low reliability, high consumer satisfaction,
and low return on investment [1]. However, thanks
to the recent advancements in automotive, electronics,
and communication technologies, electric vehicles have
overcome the issues and have become pervasive on the
present highways. Still, there are a number of challenges
to deal with in order to make electric vehicles more
practical. One of the most crucial problems is that the
capacity of the state-of-art battery for electric vehicles
is not sufficient to drive the cars over a long distance
without recharging. It is well-known that the battery
technology has been slowly improved [2], and thus we
can hardly expect to have a much higher capacity battery
for electric vehicles in the near future. Meanwhile, as
of today, there is a relatively small number of places
to recharge the battery of an electric vehicle along a
highway [3]. Most of all, compared to the time to refuel
a traditional vehicle with combustion engine, it takes
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a significant longer time to charge the battery through
plug-in technology in a charging station [4] or by staying
on a wireless charging plate (CP) [5].
Recently, the concept of online electric vehicle1 is
introduced to alleviate the aforementioned issues of
electric vehicles, where electric vehicles with a special
onboard unit can obtain the electricity on the move in
a wireless manner while passing over a road surface
under which power-line is installed. It is envisioned that
this new technology will make a significant contribution
to expand the adoption of electric vehicles. Despite the
apparent benefits, there are still a number of issues to
identify on the wide deployment of online electric vehi-
cles. In particular, consider the problem of designing a
proper billing scheme for this wireless-charging-on-the-
move strategy. One straightforward solution would be
taking a picture of every vehicle which is entering a road
designed for online electric vehicles, and send the flat
amount of bill to each of them. This strategy works well
for many vehicles with combustion engine on modern
toll highways where they pay their toll tax in a wireless
and efficient manner. However, it is clearly not fair for
online electric vehicles with almost fully charged battery
to pay the same amount of money paid by those vehicles
with almost empty battery since the driver of a vehicle
with the fully charged battery may not want to use the
online power service to save cost. In addition, collecting
the pictures of the vehicles entering every part of the
road is almost not possible and also can cause a privacy
1. http://olev.kaist.ac.kr/en/index.php
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2Fig. 1: Online electric vehicle can charge its battery
while moving after the authentication with the highway
segment.
issue, and therefore, it is not desirable even though this
strategy is widely used for toll tax collection at toll plaza
on the highways. Moreover, recently radio frequency
identification (RFID) gained a lot of attention from the
service providers and has been widely deployed due to
its simple operation and low cost [6]–[9]. However, our
case is completely different from RFID scenario because
in our case the requirements for traceability and denia-
bility are critical when compared to RFID authentication
and billing. Hence the comparison between RFID-based
solutions and our scenario would not be fair.
Motivated by our observations, in this paper, we
propose a new secure-and-fair billing framework for
online electric vehicles. In detail, we propose to adopt a
road which consists of a series of short-and-equal-sized
electricity supply segments, each of which serves as a
unit for billing. Before an online electric vehicle enters a
new segment, it can decide to use the electricity while
moving over the segment, or deny it depending on its
current battery level. Once decided to use, it needs to
authenticate itself to the segment and obtain a secret to
consume electricity (see Fig. 1). To improve the degree
of fairness and service granularity, i.e. to be billed for
actual use only, it is important to make the segment
short. At the same time, to improve the efficiency of
the segment, which is the actual rate of the segment
used for charging against the portion of the segment
used for other use such as authentication, it is crucial to
design the authentication protocol to be as lightweight
as possible. To guarantee the privacy of each driver
and reduce the operation cost, it is highly desirable not
to use camera for billing. Rather than using camera to
take the picture of each vehicle to enter every segment,
we propose a wireless communication based conditional
privacy mechanism so that the real identity of the driver
can be exposed only if there is a legal need such as
refusing to pay after actual electricity consumption. Fi-
nally and most importantly, we provide a mutual audit
mechanism through which a driver cannot deny the
usage of legitimate electricity as well as the electricity
service provider cannot overcharge.
In this paper, we propose a security framework for
electric vehicles which support the following relevant
features, and thus the contributions of this paper are:
a. Bidirectional audit: we design a mechanism that guar-
antees privacy-aware bidirectional auditability for
both electric power providing authority and the ve-
hicles. To deal with the billing and auditing, we pro-
pose a semi-simultaneous billing where each vehicle,
when it charges its battery, is billed on plate-by-plate
basis where each plate delivers a constant amount of
energy. In other words, the vehicles are billed with a
fixed amount.
b. Conditional privacy: we use multiple pseudonymous
mechanism to preserve the conditional privacy of the
vehicles at every stage of the protocol.
c. Mutual authentication: We devise a fast and
lightweight authentication mechanism for vehicles
and the charging plates keeping in mind the portion
of the charging plate designated for authentication.
d. Game-theoretic approach: We employ a game theoretic
approach to model the proposed bidirectional au-
ditability mechanism in order to establish Nash Equi-
librium between the charging plate and the vehicle.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II outlines
the state of the art regarding wireless power transfer
followed by the system model and problem definition
in Section III. In Section IV, we outline our proposed
scheme and analyze our system in Section V. In Section
VI, we give our concluding remarks.
2 STATE OF THE ART
Today, some of world most renowned automobile com-
panies are producing battery propelled vehicles and it
is envisioned that soon electric vehicles will outclass
the conventional automobiles due to economic and en-
vironmental reasons. The technological breakthrough in
both electrification technology and the energy storage
technology has made it possible for the automobile
companies to achieve this milestone. From the studied
conducted so far, it can be inferred that in the near
future, most of the fossil fuel propelled vehicles will
possibly be replaced by the electric vehicles (see [10]). In
[10], Weissenger et al. outlined the speed range, storage
range, and the battery types of vehicles till the year
2008. To date, many efficient charging schemes have been
proposed in the literature to save the commute time of
the drivers [11]. However, the frequency of recharging is
still a problem that needs to be addressed.
To motivate the use of electric vehicles, a new concept
of wireless power transfer (WPT) was introduced [5].
In [5], authors carried out a detailed survey regarding
wireless power transfer and covered many dimensions
such as the distance between the transmitting and re-
ceiving entity, cost of the technology and so forth. The
concept of green car was introduced in 2009 by KAIST,
South Korea by the name of online electric vehicle
(OLEV) [12]. The motivation for OLEV was the weight
and the cost of the battery in electric vehicles, low
frequency of charging, fast installation, low maintenance
cost and so forth. To date, remarkable results have
been achieved by this project and currently they run
3prototype buses in the KAIST campus South Korea [13],
[14]. Nonetheless, such online vehicle would require
massive power-line infrastructure installed under the
road. Moreover coverage would be another issue due to
the cost factor. From mutual authentication standpoint,
Chuang et al. [15] proposed a hash-based authentication
mechanism called trust-extended authentication mecha-
nism (TEAM). TEAM adopts the concept of transitive
trust relationships where a normal vehicle becomes the
trusted entity after successful authentication and can
delegate the authentication process in the absence of
the authorities. Moreover TEAM does not protect the
privacy since original ID is shared during authentication.
On the other hand, even if a normal vehicle successfully
authenticates itself, does not guarantee that it will not
be malicious while delegating authentication function.
Therefore, we believe that the transitive trust may lead to
even worst situation from security standpoint in VANET.
Billing is an important requirement in commercial
networks and it can be abstractly divided into two
classes, time-based billing and content-based billing. In
the former, nodes (subscribers or consumers) pay the
service fee based on time, for instance the internet access
charges and in the latter case, nodes pay based on the
content they receive where the specific content costs a
constant amount of money, for example downloading
a song from iTunes and so forth [16]. A number of
billing mechanisms have been proposed for wireless
mesh networks [17], [18] commercial VANET applica-
tion [16], [19]. In [16], the authors propose a portable
authentication/authorization/accounting (AAA) frame-
work for purchasing services from the RSUs. They use
signature-based and key policy attribute-based encryp-
tion (KP-ABE) in their billing mechanism to attain lo-
calized fine-grained access control and also employ E-
coin. In another work, Yeh et al. [19] propose a local
and proxy-based authentication and billing scheme to
lessen the long-distance communication overhead. They
also propose an incentive-aware multi-hop forwarding
for vehicles in the VANET. They use batch verification
mechanism in their scheme to fulfill the security require-
ments and signature-based communications. However,
our service scenario is different because we deal with
the charging plates installed underneath the road and
such sophisticated cryptographic primitives will cause
enormous delay. Therefore aforementioned schemes are
not directly applicable in our scenario.
In this paper, we to the best of our knowledge, for the
first time propose a secure and privacy-aware mecha-
nism to transfer the electric power to propel the vehicles
moving on the road where the power transfer technology
is installed underneath the road in the form of charging
plates. Moreover our proposed scheme also guarantees
bidirectional audit. First we propose two lightweight and
fast privacy-aware mutual authentication mechanisms
between the vehicles and the charging plates installed
under the road. The two authentication mechanisms
can be adapted with different vehicular speeds and the
Fig. 2: Taxonomy of System Participants
length of the charging plates. Then we propose a secure
charging mechanism for vehicles with bidirectional au-
ditability guarantee where vehicle is billed in a semi-
simultaneous manner on the per-plate basis. We also
employ a game theoretic approach for modeling and
guaranteeing auditability by establishing Nash Equilib-
rium between the charging plates and the vehicles.
3 SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATE-
MENT
3.1 System Participants and Network Model
Our proposed system model consists of electric vehicles
and an electric power delivery infrastructure. Electric
power delivery service is exercised by the charging
service providing authority (CSPA) that is responsible
for providing the vehicles with electric charge through
charging plates and bill them accordingly. The charging
infrastructure is installed under the surface of the road
and each road segment of certain length is covered by
the charging plates. The charging plates also have a
hardware for communication and computation purpose
and these plates are responsible for authentication prior
to battery charging, billing and logging the audit infor-
mation. These charging plates communicate with both
vehicles and CSPA back and forth during the charging
and the billing process. We also introduce some compo-
nents from vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) which
are frequently assumed in VANET. These components
are used by electric vehicles2 for initialization and regis-
tration. These components include vehicle management,
registration and revocation authorities. The department
of motor vehicles (DMV) is at the top of the hierarchy
where every vehicle should be registered beforehand.
Revocation authorities are leveraged to revoke the iden-
tity of the vehicle when needed with the consent from
law enforcement authorities (police or judiciary) in the
2. Throughout the paper, the terms ’vehicle’, ’vehicular node’, and
’OBU’ are used interchangeably and we mean electric vehicle collec-
tively by these terms.
4form of a warrant. There may be heterogeneous types of
vehicles on the road, but for ease of understanding, we
focus only on the electric vehicles in this paper. There-
fore, our proposed scheme can be easily implemented in
the VANET framework, which is one of the most popular
and promising future vehicular infrastructure.
The taxonomy of the system participants is shown
in Fig. 2 and the network model is shown in Fig. 3.
We consider a fleet of electric vehicles on the road
where these vehicles receive electric power from the
power line installed beneath the road, depending upon
the usage of the vehicle. It can be seen in Fig 1 that
road segment consists of the power line distribution
technology installed beneath the road in the form of
charging plates. A portion of the charging plate is
leveraged for authentication purpose and the rest of
the charging plate is used for transferring the electrical
energy to the vehicle (see Fig. 1). Vehicles mutually
authenticate each other with the charging plate before
receiving electric power from the plates. After successful
authentication, the fixed designated amount of electrical
energy is transferred to the battery and the vehicle is
billed accordingly. The communication channel between
vehicles, registration and revocation authorities, and the
charging plates is based on Dedicated Short Range Com-
munication (DSRC)3 standard whereas charging plates
are connected to the charging service providers through
high speed wired links. Our proposed scheme is based
on the following assumptions.
a. Electric vehicles are equipped with On Board Unit
(OBU) and Tamper-Resistant Module (TRM) to carry
out the secure computation.
b. DMV is a trustworthy entity and only DMV is au-
thorized to initialize the TRM and store necessary
security parameters and keys in it, whereas CSPA,
charging plates and OBUs are non-trustworthy.
c. Every vehicle is also pre-loaded with a pool of
pseudonyms (traceable by revocation authorities) for
privacy reasons.
d. Charing plates are installed under the designated
road segments by CSPA and are equipped with hard-
ware that is capable of carrying out secure computa-
tion and communication operations.
e. Vehicles change their pseudonyms at every charging
phase.
f. The charging process is not automatic and it can be
started with the consensus of the driver if the battery
needs to be recharged.
g. For a single charging plate, a fixed amount of charge
is transferred to the battery and a fixed amount of bill
is charged to the customer, and thus a semi-static and
fixed billing system.
Moreover the proposed billing framework must fulfill
the following requirements.
R-1 While transferring electric power to the vehicle,
bidirectional auditability must be guaranteed. In
3. [Online] http://www.iteris.com/itsarch/html/standard/dsrc5ghz.htm
Fig. 3: The Network Model
other words, the vehicle must not be over-billed and
the CSPA must not be under-paid.
R-2 The conditional privacy of the vehicle’s location and
the user must be preserved. The identity of a vehicle
owner should be revoked to the power supplier only
if it is legally necessary, e.g. refuse to pay.
R-3 Due to the resource constraints of the charging plate
and the speed of the vehicle, the communication
between charging plate and OBU, and between
charging plate and CSPA must be minimal. More-
over the authentication mechanism must be very
fast and lightweight.
R-4 The billing procedure must be verifiable by all the
entities, i.e. OBU, CSPA, and DMV.
R-5 At the time of charging, both the players should be
in the Nash Equilibrium state.
3.2 Threat Model
In our threat model, we consider that both participating
parties (charging plate and OBU) may be malicious.
Their behavior can be malicious in terms of either by-
passing the billing process or overcharging the energy
receiving entity. Besides, the CSPA can also abuse the
privacy of the electric power consumer vehicle by either
exposing their location information or selling out their
location-based profile to other third parties such as ads
agencies and so forth. Moreover, the adversaries can sniff
the communication between charging plate and OBU,
modify it or forge it. We argue that the adversaries
will have more resources than the participating entities.
However, the timeliness of possible attack is a challeng-
ing front for the adversaries where the possible attacks
must be performed within the stipulated time that is
equal to the duration of the charging and billing.
4 PROPOSED BIDIRECTIONAL AUDITABILITY
IN ONLINE ELECTRIC VEHICLE
In this section we outline the proposed power trans-
fer and billing mechanism and the bidirectional audit
5between the charging plate and the OBU by a game-
theoretic approach.
4.1 Baseline
Before using the wireless electric energy transfer service
on the move, vehicles must have registered with the
DMV to initialize their TRM and to store the security
parameters and pseudonyms in it. Additionally, the vehi-
cles must also register with the CSPA to get the necessary
security parameters, required to the charging plates at
authentication stage. Whenever a vehicle4 enters the
road section with power line underneath it, it opts for
either obtaining the electric power or not. If the vehicle
selects the power reception, then it has to mutually
authenticate with the charging plate. We propose two
very fast and lightweight mutual authentication mech-
anisms, one is based on only hash and XOR functions
and inspired by the Chuang et al.’s scheme [15], while
the second one is based on the hash chain. The former
is a direct authentication between charging plate and
OBU whereas the latter is authentication through CSPA.
In the former scheme, charging plate incurs minimum
communication delay whereas in the latter, charging
plate incurs minimum computation delay. Both of the
proposed scheme are suited for specific purposes that are
explained in the paper. After successful authentication,
the power transfer process starts and charging plate
sends the billing information to both OBU and CSPA.
The billing is fixed on per charging plate basis. We also
model the billing and audit as a game between OBU
and charging plate where both of them must achieve
the Nash Equilibrium state.
4.2 Preliminaries and Initializations
4.2.1 System Initialization
Notations in Table 1 are employed throughout the paper.
We use pseudonymous approach for privacy preserva-
tion. In addition, in order to store the individual secret
keys of the vehicles, i.e. Ksym and KV in the revocation
authorities (RAs), we use ElGamal encryption algorithm
over elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) due to its proven
security. Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q where
G is generated by a generator P . First of all DMV chooses
a random number x ∈ Z∗ as its private and computes
PK+ = xP as its public key. DMV then uses threshold
based secret share scheme [20] and divides x into j
parts where j is the number of revocation authorities,
each RAi holds a share xi and xi ∈ (x1, x2, x3, ..., xj). In
order to construct x from individual xi, RAs must elect
one of them to be group leader and construct x from
combination of xi. For the selection of group leader, any
available efficient group leader election mechanism in
the networks can be used.
4. The term ‘vehicle’throughout the rest of the paper should be read
as electric vehicle. For the sake of simplicity we use the term vehicle
instead of charging vehicles.
4.2.2 TRM Installation
Only DMV is authorized to install the TRM in the vehicle
for the first time after purchase or re-purchase. The
owner of the vehicle has to personally visit the DMV for
the installation and/or initialization of the TRM. After
confirming the credentials of the vehicle and its owner,
DMV initializes TRM and saves the system parameters
in the TRM including (G, q, P, PK+, cV , incV ). Addition-
ally DMV also preloads TRM with vehicle’s individual
secret key KV and pseudonym generation key Ksym.
4.2.3 Pseudonyms Assignment
DMV generates n number of pseudonyms for each
vehicle by taking vehicles secret counter cV and in-
crement it by vehicle V ’s incrementing factor incV .
The pseudonyms are generated as follows: PSiOBU =
{(α)Ksym‖(α⊕ ID)KV ‖ni}K−DMV where α = cV +ni·incV ,
ni is the current count of generated pseudonym (note
that it may not be linear), and ID is the vehicle’s
identity. Then DMV stores these pseudonyms in its
database and indexes it with the value of n. After all
pseudonyms are generated for the vehicles, DMV saves
these pseudonyms in vehicle’s TRM along with another
value XOBU = h(PS1OBU , PS
2
OBU , ..., PS
n
OBU ) and sends
the anonymous pseudonyms to RAs as well. In order to
help in revocation, TRM also encrypts both Ksym and
KV and sends it to RAs which serve as a trapdoor in
revocation. The aforementioned keys are encrypted with
public master key using ElGamal encryption as follows:
δ1 = rP, δ2 = (Ksym‖KV )⊕H(rPK+)
r is a random nonce selected by the TRH for this
encryption, then it sends {δ1, δ2} to RAs. However RAs
can only decrypt the keys Ksym and KV when they have
a warrant to do so after colluding to construct x from
individual xi. The reason for saving encrypted keys in
RAs database is twofold: RAs use these keys to revoke
a vehicle in case of any dispute and for privacy reasons;
we do not want RAs to link pseudonyms and/or extract
cV and incV from the beacons until necessary, otherwise.
It is also to be noted that when a vehicle consumes all
the pseudonyms it has in the pseudonym pool, it needs
to obtain a batch of fresh pseudonyms from the DMV.
The vehicle does not need to be physically present at
DMV, rather it can obtain the pseudonyms from DVM
by connecting through internet. We assume that the
existing pseudonym refilling strategies can be used [21]–
[24]. Now we outline the two mechanisms for mutual
authentication and billing.
4.3 Direct Mutual Authentication (DMA)
In the direct approach, OBU and CP mutually authenti-
cate each other without intervention of the CSPA. First
of all CSPA creates l number of master secret keys
MSK based on hash chain by selecting a secret s where
MSKi = h
i(s) and sends the key to DMV as follows:
CSPA→ DMV :MSKi(i = 1, 2, 3, ..., l)
6TABLE 1: Legend for symbolic notations
Notation Explanation
G Cyclic group of Order q
P The generator of G
r Random nonce
x,xi Private master key and i-th share of x
PK+ Public key corresponding to x
K+DMV ,K
−
DMV Public private key pair of DMV for signing pseudonyms
cV Vehicle V’s secret initial counter used in pseudonym generation
incV Incrementing factor for pseudonyms
Ksym Vehicle V ’s AES symmetric key used in pseudonym generation
KV V ’s individual secret key
PSiOBU Vehicle V’s ith pseudonym
MSK Hash Chain based Master secret key
XOBU Hash of the overall pseudonym pool
CertOBU OBU’s anonymous certificate issued by a certification authority
PWDOBU OBU’s initial password to log in to the system in order to start registration
H(·) A MaptoPoint hash function as H : {0, 1}∗ → G
h(·) Collision-resistant hash function
hk(·) Keyed hash function
⊕ Exclusive OR operation
|| Concatenation function
MSKi is a hash chain based master secret key which
is based on a secret s and MSKl = hl(s). In other
words, each MSKi is used for a designated amount of
time, and CSPA updates MSKi after regular intervals.
Since MSKi is distributed by CSPA, it can be updated
in timely manner by CSPA and vehicles will receive
the updated MSKi in their next registration phase with
CSPA. After that, DMV also sends XOBU of the regis-
tered vehicles to CSPA for records.
DMV → CSPA : XOBU
Each vehicle has a pool of legitimate traceable
pseudonyms from DMV and at the time of authentica-
tion, it can use any pseudonym to start charging. The
vehicle will be billed based on the used pseudonym.
4.3.1 Vehicle Registration with CSPA
The vehicle, most precisely its OBU, must register with
CSPA before charging. We assume a secure channel
between CSPA and the vehicle. The registration of the
vehicle proceeds as follows. The vehicle starts with the
password and upon access, the CSPA calculates some
security parameters for the vehicle and sends it back to
the OBU. The different steps and their descriptions are
given below:
a. OBU → CSPA : PWDOBU , XOBU . OBU sends these
values to CSPA on a secure channel. If PWDOBU is
valid, then the protocol will proceed.
b. CSPA calculates the following 3 values, i.e. H1, H2,
and H3. H1 is used as a secure parameter kept by
CSPA. H2 and H3 are the authentication parameters
that are sent back to the OBU.
H1 = h(s‖XOBU )
H2 = h
2(s‖XOBU )
H3 =MSK ⊕H1
c. CSPA registers the OBU by sending the hash function
h(), H2, and H3 to the OBU and recording these
parameters by storing it in its database against the
value of XOBU .
CSPA→ OBU : XOBU , h(), H2, H3.
4.3.2 Authentication between OBU and CP
After completing the registration phase with CSPA,
when the vehicle passes through the section of the
power-line-enabled road, it starts authentication process
with the charging plate. The vehicle starts by selecting
a pseudonym from its pool of pseudonym and proceeds
the whole electric power receiving process with the se-
lected pseudonym anonymously. The partial per charg-
ing bill is prepared based on the presented pseudonym
in the authentication/charging process. It is to be noted
that a fixed amount of electric power is delivered to
the vehicle’s power reception module that costs a fixed
amount. The comprehensive mutual authentication steps
are given below:
a. OBU selects a pseudonym PSiOBU , i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n
from its pool and calculates the following parameters.
c1 = h(H2)⊕ PSiOBU
c2 = h(PS
i
OBU )⊕XOBU
c3 = h(h(PS
i
OBU )‖c2‖H3)
b. Then OBU sends CP, the values calculated in previous
step along with H3.
OBU → CP : c1, c2, c3, H3
c. CP executes the following steps.
i. Start with H3 and extract the secret H1 as MSK⊕
H1 ⊕MSK.
ii. It calculates H2 and extracts PSiOBU from c1.
iii. Then it checks for the value c2 if it is equal to
h(PSiOBU )⊕XOBU .
7Fig. 4: Authentication process in DMA scenario
iv. And check if c3 is equal to the retrieved values
h(h(PSiOBU )‖c2‖H3) then the OBU is authenti-
cated, otherwise the authentication fails. It is to
be noted that there will be a fixed number of tries,
failing which will halt the authentication process.
After successful authentication, OBU and CP initi-
ate the protocol to construct a session key SKOBU−CP
which is used for the later communication and billing
parameters. The initialization of session key from CP
serves as an acknowledgement to authentication as well.
The OBU will not have been authenticated, otherwise.
CP extracts XOBU from the received messages c2 and
selects its nonce as rcp and calculates session key as
SKOBU−CP = h(PSiOBU‖rcp). CP also calculates the
following parameters.
c4 = IDcp ⊕ rc
c5 = rc ⊕ h(h(PSiOBU ))
c6 = h(rc‖c4‖c5)
c7 = H1 ⊕ h2(PSiOBU )
IDcp is the ID of the charging plate. After calculating
the above values, CP constructs an authentication reply
message and sends it back to OBU. This authentication
reply means that OBU has been authenticated and other
parameters will be sent for the session key calculation.
The following authentication reply message is sent to
OBU.
CP → OBU : c4, c5, c6, c7
From the above reply message, OBU extracts rc from
c4 and checks if c6 is equal to h(rc‖c4‖c5). If the in-
formation is correct, then the OBU authenticates CP
as well and computes the session key SKOBU−CP =
h(PSiOBU‖rc), extracts H1 from c7 and stores it as a
security parameter.
At this point in time, the mutual authentication is
completed and the electric power reception process will
start based on the established session key SKOBU−CP .
When these two entities (OBU and CP) authenticate
each other then the vehicle will receive the designated
power from the road (charging plate). At the end of
each phase of the charging plate at CPi, a unit cost Ci
will be accumulated to the account of the OBU against
its presented PSiOBU . At the end of the whole power
transfer from a number of charing plates, both OBU and
CSPA will have the log of the amount of transferred
power and the OBU will be billed accordingly which
will be verifiable by both CSPA and the OBU. The whole
authentication process in case of DMA, is shown in Fig 4.
4.4 Pure Hash Chain based Authentication (PHA)
For a fast moving vehicle the DMA approach can be ap-
plied where computation is done locally by the charging
plate; however, DMA may incur reasonable computation
delay. Therefore we propose another indirect authenti-
cation mechanism based on hash chain carried out by
CSPA where computation delay is minimum whereas
a small communication delay is introduced. Moreover
this mechanism is most favorable for low speed vehicles.
DMV provides the OBU with n pseudonyms PSiOBU , i =
1, 2, 3, ..., n, and hash chain corresponding to each
pseudonym h(PSiOBU ), h
2(PSiOBU ), ..., h
n(PSiOBU ). We
assume that for the sake of charging the vehicle’s battery,
the vehicle registers with the CSPA based on the policy.
In other words, the car uses a new hash chain based
on the designated interval in the policy. Authentication
process takes place as follows:
a. The vehicle registers with CSPA and sends one of the
hash chain head to CSPA hn(PSiOBU ).
OBU → CSPA : hn(PSiOBU ), XOBU , CertOBU
b. At the time of authentication and request for charg-
ing, the vehicle must provide the CP with a member
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hash from the registered hash chain hn−1(PSiOBU ).
OBU → CP : hn−1(PSiOBU ), XOBU
c. CP forwards this value to the CSPA.
CP → CSPA : timestamp, hn−1(PSiOBU ), XOBU
d. CSPA validates the hash, checks if h(hn−1(PSiOBU )) =
hn(PSiOBU ) and replies accordingly. CSPA also re-
places hn(PSiOBU ) with h(h
n−1(PSiOBU )). In addition
to authentication, CSPA also provides the CP with a
session key SKOBU−CP and saves it in its database
with time and the XOBU . It is to be noted that, CSPA
issues a single session key for all the plates for a
particular vehicle and a particular hash chain.
CSPA→ CP : Auth.Status, {SKOBU−CP }K+OBU
CP → OBU : {SKOBU−CP }K+OBU
e. If the authentication is successful then charging plate
will transfer the electric power to the vehicle, other-
wise the process halts. It is to be noted that one hash
chain is long enough to use it for the whole day. For
the next day, the vehicles can register another hash
chain. This process will still preserve the conditional
privacy of the OBU.
The protocol for pure hash chain based authentication
mechanism is given in Fig 5.
4.5 Power Transfer, Billing, and Auditability
Once the mutual authentication is completed between
the charging plate and OBU, the vehicle starts to re-
ceive the power from the road (charging plate) semi-
simultaneously with billing. More precisely, the vehicle
is billed at a charging plate level. At the end of the
charging process, the total bill is accumulated both at
OBU and the CSPA. The process is explained in case of
both direct and indirect authentication as shown in Fig 6
and Fig 7.
4.5.1 Online Electric Power Transfer and Billing in DMA
In case of DMA, CSPA has access to the pseudonym
used in the authentication process through CP. Therefore
after a successful authentication and establishment of
a session key, vehicle requests for the electric power
and presents the charging palte and CSPA with the
pseudonym and other parameters for the billing pur-
pose. The series of steps are given below:
OBU → CP :
{timestamp‖ChargingReq.‖PSiOBU‖hKV (α)}SKOBU−CP ,
α = (timestamp‖ChargingReq.‖PSiOBU )
CP → OBU : {Ack, timestamp‖PSiOBU‖hKV (α)}
At this point the charging plate starts billing and
sends the bill log to OBU and to CSPA. The bill is
logged against two values, XOBU and the consumed
pseudonym PSiOBU .
CP → CSPA : (timestamp‖PSiOBU‖XOBU‖CostCPi)
CSPA : CostXOBU =
∑n
i=1 CostCPi
In case of DMA, the CSPA accumulates all partial billing
information from individual charging plates and bill
the OBU accordingly. It is worth noting that we use a
constant cost per charging plate.
4.5.2 Online Electric Power Transfer and Billing in PHA
In case of PHA, the CSPA does not have access to
individual pseudonyms; rather it maintains the billing
information based on the XOBU value. After successful
authentication, OBU requests for online power transfer
and the electric power transfer begins. Meanwhile, CSPA
bills the cost for the current CP and accumulates it to the
account against XOBU with timestamp information. The
series of steps are given below:
9OBU → CP :
{timestamp‖ChargingReq.‖XOBU‖hKV (β)}SKOBU−CP ,
β = (timestamp‖ChargingReq.‖XOBU )
The charging plate forwards the request to CSPA where
CSPA constructs a reply message for the OBU. Mean-
while when charging plate receives the reply message
from CSPA, the vehicle will start receiving power and
CSPA will record the cost for the current charging plate.
CSPA→ CP : (timestamp‖XOBU‖hKV (β))
Charging plate forwards the message to OBU accord-
ingly whereas CSPA calculates the bill for current charg-
ing plate and accumulates with the partial bills from
previous charging plates.
CSPA : CostXOBU =
∑n−1
i=1 CostCPi−1 + CostCPi
This way, CSPA calculates the bill partially simultane-
ously with charging process which is the motive of our
GHP game. We will discuss our OBU-CP game in the
next subsection.
4.6 Bidirectional Auditability Game
We formalize the bidirectional auditability as an instance
of the Guest-Host problem (GHP) with game-theoretic
approach. In the GHP, the guest wants to use the hotel
for a few days and does not want to get a bill (no) greater
than actual use. Whereas the host wants to charge the
bill to the guest for the actual (or more) use but wants to
make sure that the guest does not deny the actual use.
In our scenario, OBU can be assumed as guest and the
charging plate as the host.
We explain the bidirectional auditability between OBU
and charging plate with the help of an uncooperative
game G which is defined as a triplet (P ,S,PO). P is
the set of players of the game, S is the set of strategies
followed by the players and PO is the set of payoff
functions as a result of the players’ strategies.
4.6.1 Players
The set of players P = {OBU,CP} corresponds to the
set of OBUs and the charging plate (CP). There can
be multiple OBUs serviced by the CP but we assume
that at certain instant of time, only single OBU will
be entertained at the start of the CP. Without loss of
generality, multiple OBUs can recharge their batteries
after successful authentication.
4.6.2 Strategy/Move
In our game, each of the two players follow two
strategies, either Cooperate(C) or Deviate(D) and thus
Si = {C,D}. Moreover in cooperation state, each player
makes a move that produces a better payoff. By coop-
erating, a vehicle changes its pseudonym every time
is charges the battery and the CP bills it accordingly.
TABLE 2: Strategic moves of the players in the game G
OBU \ CP C D
C 1, 1 1, 0
D 0, 1 −1,−1
Whereas in case of deviation, OBU misbehaves and does
not follow the protocol or CP overcharges the bill against
OBU.
4.6.3 Payoff Function
We formulate a payoff function for both players of the
game. The payoff function PO(t) is given by:
POi(t) = ai(t)− costi(t)
ai(t) is the advantage of player i at time t and costi(t) is
the cost of achieving ai(t). It is to be noted that ai(t) de-
pends upon the successful battery charging and the nor-
mal billing and costi(t) depends upon the pseudonym
change for charging and the authentication overhead for
both CP and OBU.
In game G, the players do not know the strategic
behavior of the opponent unless the complete billing has
been done. Since we have only two strategic behaviors
from the set Si = {C,D}, there is 50% probability for the
players to guess the behavior of the opponent keeping
in mind its payoff.
Definition: The best response bri(Sj∈[C,D]) on the part of
a player i is a move such that:
bri(Sj∈[C,D]) = max(POi(si))
In other words, the best response of a player i will
be such that it results in a maximum payoff. If the two
players unknowingly strategically give best responses to
each other in the game, then the opponent will not have
any chance to deviate from the game and the result of the
game is called Nash Equilibrium (NE). When the game
reaches an NE, then the players cannot increase their
payoff by changing their strategy or deviating from the
best response strategy.
4.7 Nash Equilibrium in G
In NE, every player plays its best move and correctly
anticipates that its opponent will do the same. In Table
2, we outline the possible moves made by each players.
In our game, there is only one NE which is achieved
through (C,C). It is worth noting that a game may
have more than one Nash Equilibria depending upon
the nature of the game. In our game, the best strategy
for OBU is to choose ‘C’ no matter what charging plate
chooses between ‘C’and ‘D’. This is because the only
way for OBU to maximize its payoff in the form of
battery charge and fair billing is to choose ‘C’at the
expense of the cost incurred by changing pseudonym
and shared authentication overhead. OBU may not know
the strategy of the charging plate. The ‘D’ strategy will
cause the loss which is unfair auditability leading to
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revocation for both CSPA and the OBU. Therefore from
the strategic Table 2, (1, 1) is the best response from
both side, where they cannot increase their payoff by
changing their strategy.
5 EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
5.1 Security and Privacy Analysis
The security of our proposed scheme depends upon
the collision resistance property of the one-way hash
function. Given any m, it is easy to compute h(m), and
computationally very difficult to calculate the value of
m from h(m). The most basic security requirement of
our proposed scheme is mutual authentication between
charging plate and OBU. With our proposed lightweight
authentication protocol which is an extended version of
Chuang et al.’s [15] protocol, mutual authentication is
guaranteed before starting the charging process. If the
underlying hash mechanism is secure, then our proposed
authentication can be considered secure. However the ef-
fect of keys compromise can be critical for our proposed
scheme. From the OBU perspective, compromising KV
does not have dire consequences because the adversary
A can get only a part of pseudonym, not the whole
pseudonym. In case of the compromising both Ksym and
KV , A can not only manipulate pseudonyms, but can
reuse them. Moreover our system can prevent the secret
sharing attack because a vehicle must authenticate itself
prior to charging its battery. Since the charging plate
authenticates the user, therefore two users cannot use the
same secret and/or re-use it because timestamp and the
local log of the usage of charging plate or CSPA will stop
the vehicles from doing so. In other words, the protocol
must follow the steps: (i) registration, (ii) authentication
and (iii) power transfer.
Secure bidirectional auditability is provided through
semi-simultaneous billing procedure incorporated in our
proposed scheme. Each charging plate is capable to
transfer a fixed amount of electrical energy to the battery
and bill the vehicle with a fixed amount. Since vehicles
use either individual pseudonyms PSiOBU , or the com-
bined hash value XOBU , the final bill is the combination
of the costs of individual charging plates. Each OBU
knows the cost per charging plate, and it records the
cost in its log as well. Both CSPA and OBU can verify the
individual and final bill of the power transfer in a liable
and a non-repudiate manner. It is also worth noting that
it is the duty of CSPA to make sure the freshness of the
session key and use different session keys in different
charging plates for security reasons. The behavior of both
charging plate and OBU from security perspective is
depicted by the game G where they establish NE during
charging transaction.
Our proposed scheme also preserves conditional pri-
vacy of the users during electric power transferring and
billing process. We do not use any real identity that
could lead to the actual user, instead we use a series
of legitimate pseudonyms.
Moreover in order to measure the privacy and the
anonymity of the vehicles, we calculate the entropy
of the user denoted by H. The anonymity set needed
entropy calculation is, the set of active vehicles at the
certain time t that are in the process of charging their
batteries. Let anonymity set is U and let pUi is the
probability that the node Ui be the target vehicle whose
anonymity is being calculated or Ui is under surveillance
by adversary A, where ∀Ui ∈ U ,
∑|U |
i=1 pUi = 1. The
entropy H of the target user Ui in the anonymity set
U is given by: H = −∑|U |i=1 pUi × log2 pUi . Since our
anonymity set is U , the possible outcomes can be |U |
assuming the fair distribution and the probability of
each outcome will be 1|U | . If the distribution is normal
and the occurrence of the nodes to be related to the
pseudonyms in question is equally likely, then the max-
imum entropy is also given by the following formula:
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Hmax = −
∑|U |
i=1 pUi × log2 pUi = log2 pUi .
Theorem 1. In case of any dispute, the node in question can
be revoked and the pseudonym in question is linkable to the
actual user
Proof: In order to proceed with revocation, RAs get
the warrant from the authorities and then look into the
n values of the message in question that are provided to
RAs in order to figure out which pseudonym was used.
After that, RAs collude and construct x from individual
xi related to the pseudonym in question and the session
leader decrypts the keys from cipher text c = {δ1, δ2}
as follows: PSiOBU = δ2 ⊕ H(xδ1) = (Ksym‖KV ) ⊕
H(rPK+) ⊕ H(rxPK+). When RAs decrypt the keys
Ksym and KV , then revocation is almost done, all RAs
have to do is to decrypt the (α)Ksym and then extract ID
of the vehicle from the pseudonym.
Lemma 1. It is hard to impersonate other OBU in the process
of online power transfer. In other words, it is hard to get away
with billing procedures.
Proof: Before starting the power transfer procedure,
the vehicles have to register with CSPA in both direct
and hash chain-based authentication and provide CSPA
with XOBU . And at the authentication stage, OBU has to
provide the charging plate with c1 and c3 that contain
H2 and H3 respectively. At the registration phase, H2
is associated to the XOBU of the current authenticating
vehicle. Therefore any adversary A with H2’ without
knowing the secret s, it will be hard to calculate valid
c1, c2, and c3 at the authentication phase. Therefore the
values sent to the CP for authentication will be c1’, c2’,
c3’, and H3’ all of which must have association with
the XOBU of the pseudonym PSiOBU . Arguing on the
collision resistance of the hash function used, it can
be inferred that the probability of calculating the right
values with not knowing the XOBU is small, therefore it
is hard for anybody to impersonate other OBU with a
pseudonym.
The following corollary naturally follows:
Corollary 1. Replaying the power transfer request message
and/or Pseudonym will not benefit the malicious intent of the
user.
The argument is divided into two parts. Replaying a
message will result in the existence of previous power
transfer records with this information. Upon success-
ful power transfer, the CSPA maintains a log with
timestamp and billing information against the used
pseudonym. Let an OBU charges its battery at CPx at
particular time ti after successful authentication, the log
is recorded at CSPA with the used pseudonym and other
credentials. At ti+j , the OBU again uses the message,
then there are two possibilities. First, the OBU must have
already been authenticated before sending this message;
in that case, it will receive the power accordingly, sec-
ondly if it is not authenticated, then CSPA must have
figured out that the record already existed and that the
OBU was malicious. In either case, the OBU cannot
benefit from such behavior. The same argument stands
for the pseudonym as well.
5.2 Computation and Communication Overhead
In this subsection we consider the computation and
communication overhead incurred by the OBU and
CP in the process of mutual authentication and power
transfer. In the computation overhead, we consider the
authentication cost incurred by OBU and CP denoted
by Tauth−OBU and Tauth−CP respectively and the cost of
revocation denoted by Trev in the direct authentication
method. When OBU mutually authenticates with CP,
it performs 3H + 2EO operations, where H denotes
the hash operation and EO denotes the exclusive OR
operation. CP performs 6H + 5EO operations. The cost
12
of revocation Trev in our proposed scheme is given by:
Trev = 2Tγ + 2Tmul + 2TH + 2Tdec
Tγ is the time incurred by the pseudonym search table,
Tmul is the time required for point multiplication, TH is
the time required to calculate hash, and Tdec is the time
required for symmetric decryption. In [20], Tmul is found
for a supersingular curve with embedding k = 6 over
F397 to be equal to 0.78 ms. Hence the above equations
can be written as:
Trev = 1.56 + 2(Tγ + TH + Tdec)
We also discuss the authentication processing time
by both OBU and CP. According to [15], SHA2 hash
operation takes 0.76 µsec. Therefore OBU takes about
2.28 µsec and CP takes about 4.56 µsec. It is worth
noting that since the XOR operation time is usually
a single clock on CPUs which is infinitesimally small,
therefore we ignore it. In case of the hash chain-based
authentication, OBU cost is only 1D, where D denotes
the decryption operation. CSPA incurs 1H+1E, E is the
encryption operation.
We also calculate the authentication overhead. In case
of DMA, the communication overhead is equal to 71+u,
where u is the size of the pseudonym. We assume
SHA − 512 as a hash function and consider the [25]
implementation of timestamp which is 6 bytes. Simi-
larly, in case of PHA the communication overhead is
fixed and incurs 135 bytes where timestamp is 6 bytes,
ChargingReq. is 1 byte, XOBU is 64 bytes and hKV (β) is
also 64 bytes.
5.3 Length of Charging Plate
The efficiency of the power transfer and the auditabil-
ity depends upon the length of the charging plate.
Therefore, the length of the charging plate must be a
tradeoff between the authentication and billing delay
and the time required to acquire the specified amount
of electrical power from the charging plate. The plate
should not be too short where a vehicle cannot receive
the promised amount of power after spending most of
the time on the authentication and billing. Similarly the
plate should not be too long, where mutual auditability
is on stake and semi-simultaneous audit is not possible.
To date, the size of the segment is not fixed; however,
OLEV project considers the length of the segment to be
5 m which is still controversial because of the authenti-
cation and billing overhead incurred by the number of
segments. Another important point is that the length of
the segment is a design feature where the amount of
electrical power, authentication and billing delay, and
the time to acquire the guaranteed charge should be
taken into account. In our scenario, we argue that the
authentication delay incurred by both OBU and charging
plate is less than a microsecond (optimistically) due
to the design of authentication scheme. Therefore the
uniformity of the pickup devices installed in the vehicles,
and the capacity of delivering electrical power by the
charging plates will play a vital role in deciding the
length of the plate.
5.4 Discussion
In this subsection we analyze the effect of the two
authentication strategies on the efficiency and the design
parameters. In DMA, OBU and CP have to perform
relatively more operations as compared to PHA; nev-
ertheless the time consumed by these operations (hash
and XOR) is less than encryption operation. That is why
we argue that in performance, DMA will outperform
PHA. Secondly, in DMA, both parties are involved in
setting up the session key with mutual agreement. The
communication cost is minimum since OBU and charg-
ing plate are communicating directly. Therefore the only
parameter that could affect the performance of DMA
and PHA, is the length of the charging plate. If we
consider the normal speed of the vehicle, then PHA will
favor the lengthier charging plate than DMA, because of
the communication delay incurred by the PHA. On the
other hand, PHA does not cost any computation delay
because the processing is carried out at resource rich
CSPA and charging plate is only used as intermediary.
However, in case of PHA, the session key is constructed
by one entity, CSPA. Moreover the OBUs must save the
hash chain of the currently used pseudonyms in the on-
board storage thereby incurring storage cost. Therefore
we can argue that, these two methods can be used in
different circumstances that fit the necessary conditions
for direct and hash-based authentication. For normal
scenarios, DMA will be the fair choice because of its
security, auditability guarantee, and robustness.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a secure, privacy-aware, and
bidirectional auditable mechanism for wireless power
transfer in online electric vehicles. The power transfer
technology is installed under the road in the form of
charging plates where a segment of the road constitute
a charging plate containing a hardware module for com-
munication and lightweight computation. In our pro-
posed scheme, the vehicles use multiple pseudonymous
strategy to mutually authenticate with the charging plate
and then expedite the power transfer. Meanwhile electric
power service provider bills the vehicles on per charg-
ing palate basis. Our proposed scheme provides secure
and privacy-aware bidirectional auditability where the
billing process is verifiable by both parties. Moreover
we also present the game theoretic approach to validate
the bidirectional auditability.
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